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ABSTRACT 
 
The operating room is one of the most complex work environments in healthcare; 
it is estimated that at least 7% of adverse events due to medical error occur in the 
operating room.  Flow disruptions are events that cause a “break” in the primary surgical 
task, or the loss of any team member’s situational awareness. An empirical link between 
flow disruptions and surgical errors in the OR has been established; therefore, identifying 
and classifying the specific flow disruptions present during different types of procedures 
should facilitate the development of evidence-based interventions.  The goal of this study 
was to identify and classify flow disruptions during laparoscopic cholecystectomy 
(camera-assisted gallbladder removal) and open inguinal and umbilical hernia repair 
procedures.  Results of this study revealed seven categories of disruption that emerged 
inductively from the data collected.  These were: communication, coordination, 
external/extraneous source, training/supervisory, equipment/supplies, patient factors, and 
environment.  Though the average duration and disruption rate were similar for both 
types of procedure, the type of disruptions present during each were unique.   One 
example of this includes the higher incidence of equipment related flow disruptions 
during laparoscopic cholesystechtomies, which is the more equipment intensive 
procedure of the two observed. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE 
 
The operating room (OR) is one of the most complex working environments in healthcare 
due to the acuity level of the patients, complex treatment protocols, high level of interaction with 
technology, and large amount of coordination necessary to manage the rapidly changing 
conditions (Christian, et al. 2005).  Surgical teams must work together to effectively manage 
competing task responsibilities while also coping with the numerous distractions and 
interruptions that occur in the OR. Unfortunately, however, interruptions and distractions occur 
frequently and have been shown to negatively impact performance, teamwork, and surgical 
outcomes (Wiegmann, ElBardissi, Dearani, Daly, & Sundt, 2007; Beyea, 2007). Though 
estimates vary greatly, researchers estimate that around 45% to 50.3% of adverse events 
inmedicine relate to surgical procedures performed in the OR (O’Connor et al., 2010; Catchpole, 
Mishra, McCulloch, 2008).  
Patient Safety and Adverse Events.  Patient safety is a concern that has come to the 
forefront of the health care industry since it was reported that medical error contributes to over 
100,000 deaths per year (Kohn, Corrigan & Donaldson, 2000). This statistic can be accounted for 
primarily by adverse events (AE).  An adverse event is most commonly defined as “an injury 
caused by medical management (rather than disease process) that results in either prolonged 
hospital stay or disability at discharge” (de Vries, Ramrattan, Smorenburg, Guoma, & 
Boermeester, 2008; Michel, Quenon, Sarasqueta & Scemama, 2004; Thomas & Brennan, 2000). 
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A systematic review of the literature regarding in-hospital events found that the median overall 
incidence of AEs is 9.2%-15%, which means that more than one out of every ten patients 
admitted will experience an adverse event while under the hospital’s care (de Vries et al., 2008; 
O’Connor, Papanikolaou, & Keog, 2010). To put this problem into perspective, AEs cause a 
greater number of deaths per year than auto accidents, aircraft accidents, suicides, falls, 
poisonings, and drowning combined (Barach & Small, 2000). Recent research suggests that at 
least 50% of past AEs were preventable (de Vries et al., 2008; Thomas & Brennan, 2000).  A 
preventable AE is one that would not have occurred if the patient had received ordinary 
standards of care appropriate for the time (Michel, Quenon, Sarasqueta, & Scemama, 2004). 
Preventable AEs affecting hospitalized patients is the eighth leading cause of death in the United 
States (Thomas & Brennan, 2000). While patient safety is of utmost importance in the 
management of error in medical settings, one cannot ignore the financial burden placed upon the 
patient, the already cash-strapped medical industry, and related service providers. It is estimated 
that preventable adverse events cost the US between 17 and 29 billion dollars annually (de Vries 
et al., 2008). A review of 18 types of medical events concluded that medical errors may account 
for 2.4 million extra days in the hospital, and $9.3 billion in excess charges annually (for all 
payers)(centers for Medicare and Medicaid services, press release) (Barach & Small, 2000). 
Technological Advances.  Advances in surgical technology and technique have made it 
possible for many procedures that previously required significant surgical invasion, to be 
performed with minimal invasion, on an outpatient basis. The assistance of a laparoscopic 
camera during surgery allows surgeons to operate very effectively inside the body through a few 
very small incisions. It is believed that using this technology allows shorter surgical time than the 
traditional method and allows for faster patient recovery periods.  Improvements in performance 
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and patient safety have been observed since the introduction of laparoscopic technology (Manzey 
et al., 2009).  Consequentially, an increase has been observed in the number of patients opting 
for surgical intervention than before this technique was widely available.   
While there are benefits associated with these types of advances, there have also been 
unanticipated repercussions.  For example, concerns have been raised about the ergonomic 
design of laparoscopic tools, and the postures required for viewing monitors displaying the 
laparoscopic camera feed. These concerns are increasing with the frequency and extended 
periods these tools are being used for.  The implications of this type of surgical evolution 
illustrate how changes in one aspect of a system, such as introducing a new technology, can have 
unexpected effects of various, sometimes seemingly unrelated emergent properties or latent 
failures, that occur “downstream” from the actual change. 
There are also cognitive concerns related to laparoscopic, or image-guided navigation 
(IGN) assisted procedures.  These stem from the complexity of navigating within a three 
dimensional space represented by a two dimensional image, provided by the IGN system.  The 
limited field of view provided by the camera and the lack of depth or spatial cues place high 
demands on the surgical team’s perceptual and cognitive resources.  Manzey et al. (2009) defines 
automation as “any function previously performed solely by a human and is now carried out 
partially or completely by a machine”.  According to this definition, IGN assisted surgery is a 
type of automation.  Therefore, IGN is susceptible to the classic difficulties that accompany the 
benefits of automation.  These include, increased cognitive demands, increased psychomotor 
demands, overreliance, and degradation of manual skill (Manzey et al, 2009; Catchpole et al., 
2008).  Studies also show that significant experience (>100 cases) is required before 
improvements in performance can be seen (Manzey et al., 2009).  This suggests that significant 
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training and experience should accompany the introduction of IGN, though this is often not the 
case.   
The Systems Perspective. James Reason introduced the “Swiss Cheese Model” of 
accident causation in 1991 as a means of organizing human error data.  This model supports the 
view that errors are not caused by a single action, but rather, “holes”, or vulnerabilities 
throughout the system, which allow actions to bypass usual safety measures that would normally 
compensate for them.  Adverse events occur when several “latent” failures throughout the 
system, align with one another, allowing errors to penetrate several levels of intended defenses.  
This view supports a non-punitive approach to error that rejects personal repercussions in favor 
of utilizing information gleaned from the error to help improve the system. The “Swiss Cheese 
Model” has become the foremost conceptual “systems” model of human error since it’s 
introduction 20 years ago (Reason, 1991). 
A system is a construct or collection of different elements, that together, produce results 
not obtainable by the elements alone. The elements, or parts, can include people, hardware, 
software, facilities, policies, and documents; that is, all things required to produce systems-level 
properties, characteristics, functions, behaviors and performance. The value added by the system 
as a whole, beyond that contributed independently by the parts, is primarily created by the 
relationship among the parts; that is, how they are interconnected (A Consensus of the INCOSE 
Fellows", INCOSE, 2006). Humans are the most variable aspect of any system because they 
frequently deviate from normative work instructions and rules, and are bound to the confines of a 
fallible body and brain, prone to forgetfulness, inattention, poor motivation, carelessness, 
negligence, time pressure and recklessness, which can all increase the chance of performing an 
unsafe act (Friedman, Elinson, & Arenovich, 2005). These elements, either singularly or in 
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combination can contribute to drifts in procedures, complacency, and work-arounds, that can 
form the basis for vulnerabilities in the system. 
The systems approach to human error is based on three principles: (1) human error is 
unavoidable, as it is an inherent aspect of human work; (2) faulty systems allow human error to 
cause harm to the patient; (3) systems can be designed that prevent or detect human error before 
a patient is harmed (Etchells, O’Neill, & Bernstein, 2004).  The question that human factors 
professionals are facing right now is; which measures are most closely associated with 
determining the potential for human error and identifying latent failures throughout the system? 
For measurement of the impact of any changes or interventions introduced to the healthcare 
system, a baseline measure of the current state must be recorded for comparison.  
Human Factors. Human factors is the study of human physiological and psychological 
capabilities, limitations, and tendencies, and how they affect the interaction with their 
environment. Christien et al. (2005), defines human factors as “the study and (re)design of 
environments and processes (i.e. systems) to ensure safer, more effective, and more efficient use 
by humans”.  The extent to which the human and system “fit” together affects the success of the 
system.  Human factors research aims to understand how the human fits within the system, and 
use that understanding to re-engineer the systems to better support the humans that operate 
within them. Human factors principles can be applied to the design of equipment, processes, 
procedures, team interactions, organizational directives, and any other system component that 
has the potential to influence human behavior within the system.  Often, it is not the individual 
components of the system that are problems in their own right, rather it is the emergent 
properties that result from the interaction with other components in the system. 
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Failures of Prevention. It is better to catch failures up-stream, before they contribute to 
an incident.  This is why it is important to record failures of prevention (Woods, 2002). If a 
preventative measure is not fulfilling its role, it may not be the ideal solution for that issue, or it 
could be causing unexpected emergent properties that could be negatively affecting the system.  
If the existing procedure does not prevent the target action, it may be more beneficial to look at 
the procedure as the source of the inadequacy rather than the actions of the people performing 
them.  If the procedure itself is sound, determining why the procedure was not being followed 
will provide more insight to the underlying issue than simply assuming it wasn’t followed was 
because the person didn’t know it or was not willing to abide.  A study by Wolf, Potter ,Sledge, 
Boxerman, Grayson, & Evanoff  (2006), found that when nurses followed the hospital policy for 
medication administration, they were twice as likely to be interrupted during the task, when 
compared to those who were noncompliant.  The policy required repetitive trips to the 
medication supply room, which caused the nurses to be more visible, and therefore more 
frequently available for interruption.  The results of this study illustrate one of the major 
downfalls of measuring quality by compliance to procedure.  When a procedural “drift”, or 
habitual non-compliance occurs, it is more beneficial to look at the reason that the procedure has 
been altered than to force or punish employees for abiding by it.  It may be more efficient to 
accommodate the revision to the procedure, as it is likely that the drift occurred for a valid 
reason.  
Evidence from Other Complex Industries. Several complex industries with highly 
effective safety programs including aviation, petroleum, and nuclear power have been widely 
receptive to the systems view of human error. Evidence from the successful safety records of 
these industries suggests that healthcare could benefit from adopting a similar perspective.  “Pilot 
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error”, has long been cited as the most common cause of accidents in aviation. At least 70% of 
the airline accidents and incidents over the past 20 years can be attributed to inadequacies in non-
technical skills such as crew coordination, workload management, and decision-making 
(Hammond, 2004).  
The Medical industry is similar to the aviation industry in the sense that they are both 
highly dynamic, time sensitive and performed in complex, technology rich environments.  Many 
aspects of the system influence the state, decisions, and behavior of the humans that interact with 
it.  Some topics that have been addressed in aviation are still plaguing the medical industry.  
These include excessive work hours, task overload, sleep deprivation, team communication and 
coordination, faulty equipment, poor interface design, budget constraints, and weak safety 
cultures. Introducing aviation analogs such as debriefs, simulation, recurrent training, checklists, 
and crew resource management (CRM) to the medical industry could greatly benefit hospitals 
and patients.  
However, aviation models may not transfer seamlessly to the medical domain. The 
benefits of these programs and requirements in aviation have been years in the making. Aviation 
and medicine share some similarities, but the medical industry has many unique features not 
present in aviation. Therefore, as human factors and systems interventions are developed and 
brought to bear in the medical industry, tailored interventions based upon empirically derived 
data is of utmost importance (Helmreich, Musson, David, M., Sexton, J. B., Project).  
Need for Valid Metrics.  Valid metrics capable of capturing the effects of a broad range 
of systemic failures, across various procedures would be extremely beneficial as researchers 
proceed to explore areas other in the healthcare industry that offer the option for improvements.  
The benefits of using a consistent metric across procedures include the ability to present data in 
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aggregate, so that results to be compared between departments or even across hospitals, states, or 
regions.  This would also provide observers relatively consistent and easy to recognize, actions 
and events, which can be explored in aggregate to identify larger patterns or trends. The growing 
research interest directed at interruptions, distractions, and flow disruptions in health care 
suggest that these types of measures may be just such a metric. 
Flow Disruptions.  Interruptions and distractions occur frequently in the operating room, 
and have been shown to negatively impact performance, teamwork, and surgical outcomes 
(Wiegmann, ElBardissi, Dearani, Daly, & Sundt, 2007; Beyea, 2007). Surgical flow disruptions 
are events that result in a break in the flow of the primary surgical task, or the loss of any team 
member’s situational awareness. Situational awareness in the operating room has been described 
as; the “ability to observe, understand, and predict events in the OR”, and has shown to be 
strongly related to technical errors in surgery (Catchpole et al., 2008).  The concept of “flow” 
does not have a single definition.  In aviation, “flow” is [demonstrated through] the sequence of 
maneuvers, discussions, checklists, and read backs that mark the conduct of a safe flight” (Karl, 
2009).  In health care, it refers to the ease with which a task progresses.  Some factors that 
contribute to flow are attention, understanding, proficiency, teamwork, preparation, 
communication, coordination, and culture. There is an empirical link between flow disruptions in 
the operating room and surgical errors (Wiegmann et al., 2007). From the systems perspective, 
flow disruptions can be a symptom of a latent failure somewhere within the system.  Gaining a 
better understanding of the frequency and nature of flow disruptions will allow for the 
development of evidence-based interventions (Wiegmann et al., 2007).  
Flow disruptions collected in a single case do not hold significant merit for indicating 
system failures because there are many variables such as team member fatigue or individual 
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patient factors that can influence the progression of any single case.  Flow disruptions that 
indicate systemic failures will resurface within and across cases, revealing areas that warrant 
further investigation.  Some benefits of flow disruptions as a metric include; the ability to capture 
systemic failures of any type, the ability to acquire baseline measures that can be used for 
comparison after any type of intervention, and the ability to use a consistent metric across 
procedures.   The benefits of these features include being able to identify compensatory 
strategies, “best practices”, set benchmark data across facilities, identify systemic failures that 
may be impacting multiple processes, and collect data that will inform the development of 
evidence based interventions that address system-specific issues.   
Classification and Taxonomy. Classifying surgical flow disruptions using human 
factors taxonomies provides a means of organizing data so that trends and patterns can be 
identified.  Defining the nature of generic problems in the OR can point to appropriate remedial 
action (Catchpole et al., 2008).  A common taxonomy used by human factors practitioners is the 
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), which was originally developed 
for the aviation industry, but has since proved adaptable to many other complex industries 
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).  The HFACS taxonomy is based on Reason’s “Swiss Cheese” 
model of accident causation (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003; Reason, 1990).  The taxonomy aims 
to fill in the “holes” of the cheese, or provide a method to determine what type of “latent 
failures” exist at each level of the organization.  Once the latent failures are discovered, 
organizations can track and trend this data to monitor their frequency in each department and 
determine where interventions are needed most.  “Near misses” are events during which an error 
occurred, but was recognized before it could contribute to an adverse event.  Reporting these 
events can help to identify why latent failures before error occurs, and prevent them in the future. 
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A “latent failure” describes a bypassed or non-existent procedure, process, or equipment 
intended to act as a safety measure, but “failed” to fulfill it’s intent. This could be a sub-optimal 
relationship between a procedure in one department of the hospital and information needed in 
another, or the implementation of a piece of equipment without adequate training for the staff.  
Identifying “latent failures” through reports of “near miss” incidents and classifying the human 
error components using the HFACS taxonomy will provide valuable data that can be translated 
into systemic interventions tailored to the given situation.  
However, retrospective review of reported events impose several limitations to adequate 
identification of contributing factors related to the incident reported.   “The most effective 
technique for learning how a system has failed is to collect data prospectively about individual, 
team and system performance” (Hamman, 2004). Prospective observation of patient care 
involves real-time data collection in a naturalistic environment.  Prospective study methods are 
the best for identifying flow disruptions in highly dynamic and complex environments such as 
the OR because they allow detection of systemic vulnerabilities as well as beneficial strategies, 
which would not be possible from a method such as retrospective review of patient records 
(Hamman, 2004; Etchells et al., 2003).   
Study Goals.  The aim of this study was to prospectively observe, identify, and classify 
the type and frequency of flow disruptions present in the OR during two types of general surgery 
procedures.  The results of this study will be the identification of the most common flow 
disruptions present during each type of procedure.  Recent research has indicated that flow 
disruptions are correlated with surgical errors (Wiegmann et al., 2007).  Identifying the 
disruptions that are most likely to have a negative impact on the performance of the surgical 
team will allow evidence based interventions to be designed into systems, to decrease their 
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frequency, and mitigate their impact.  Equally important is to determine which, or when, 
disruptions can be best tolerated by the team.    
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CHAPTER II 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Participants 
 
Study participants included the surgical staff of the main hospital and the “same day”, or 
outpatient ORs in the affiliated southeastern regional hospital. Surgical teams usually consisted 
of the surgeon, one of three who voluntarily participated in the study; the “first assist” or “scrub” 
nurse, a registered nurse (RN) who assists the surgeon directly with the surgical task; the 
circulator nurse (CN), another RN who acts as the “manager” of the OR by assisting wherever 
necessary, keeping paperwork and computer records updated, and is the only team member who 
is not sterile and can leave the room on short notice without having to “scrub in”; and the 
anesthesiologist, who occasionally was assisted by, alternated with, or supervised a certified 
nurse anesthetist (CNA). The anesthesia team’s job is to keep the patient immobile, out of pain, 
and breathing with the help of a machine. This requires administering several medications and 
closely monitoring the patient’s vital signs.  On rare occasions, a medical student or trainee was 
present during the procedure.  
 
Apparatus and Materials 
 
Data collection tool.  The data collection tool used in this study was constructed after 
observing approximately 15 pilot procedures of various surgical nature including sarcoma 
removals, laparoscopic cholecystectomies and hernia repairs.  Additional information was 
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obtained from an extensive literature review, thorough discussions with the participating 
surgeons, and trial runs, all of which helped to refine the tool into its final version. The tool was 
designed to be generic enough to collect flow disruption data across both types of procedures.  
The tool, a horizontally folded four-page paper booklet, provided blank space to record details of 
the events, the time the event occurred, and other features of the OR environment to help set the 
context.    Further research will be necessary to validate the data collection tool as a reliable 
method for the uniform collection of the intended variables across procedures and surgical 
teams.  The data collection tool can be seen in Appendices E-G.  Two slightly different versions 
of the tool were used.  One was specific to the laparoscopic cholecystectomy procedure and 
included a few additional items related to the laparoscope such as whether one monitor or two 
were present. The rest of these items can be seen on the back of the data collection tool (See 
Appendices F and G). 
Informed consent.  Slightly varied wording was used on the consent forms to denote the 
respective roles of the patient and employee.  The staff was asked to consent to the observation 
and recording of “the surgical procedures you will participate in over the course of this study”, 
and patients were asked about the procedure “you are about to undergo”.  Consent from the 
surgical team was obtained following an information session with the entire OR staff about the 
goals and implications of the study during a group information session, provided with hard 
copies of the slideshow presentation containing additional information about the study, a copy of 
the data collection form, the consent form, and a brief overview of other studies that have used 
video recording.  The staff was then asked to sign the written informed consent. One of the three 
participating surgeons introduced the study to patients who met the study criteria during their 
pre-operative office visit, which usually occurred about a week before the procedure. They were 
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then presented with a written version of the study goals, risks, and procedure, and given the 
option to sign a written patient informed consent.  After a patient provided their written consent 
to participate in the study, the research team was contacted with scheduling information using an 
unidentifiable patient number.  
 
Procedure 
 
This study was a naturalistic observation, during which, researchers were present in the 
OR to observe and collect data.  Seagull and Guerlain’s 2003 review of observational measures 
in healthcare found that all studies narrowed their focus to a single problem (procedure), used or 
developed a standard data collection tool, and involved the counting or categorizing of events to 
uncover underlying themes, distractions, barriers, or training opportunities (Seagull & Guerlain, 
2003).  This study provided the ability to compare flow disruption data across two general 
surgery procedures that share several similar properties but are performed with distinctly 
different surgical techniques.    
Data Collection. Data was collected through the physical presence of a researcher using 
the earlier described data collection tool created specifically for this study. In addition, a discreet 
video recording device captured the procedure for the purpose of off-line verification. Flow 
disruption data was collected for the duration of the surgical procedure, which included 
everything that occurred between the first incision (“start time”) and the final closure (“end 
time”) as determined by the circulator nurse. Handwritten descriptions of each flow disruption 
were recorded during observations.  In the case of successive, simultaneous, or related 
disruptions, each disruption was recorded and classified separately. 
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Surgical procedures took place in the “same day” surgical center (n=17) or in the main 
ORs (n=6) of the participating hospital. The researcher entered the operating room just before the 
patient and remained in a static location that allowed both good visibility of the entire room, and 
was least obtrusive to the surgical team. All of the surgical team members remained in the 
observer’s direct field of view, except for the anesthesiologist, who was frequently obstructed by 
the surgical drape, and occasionally the circulator nurse who frequently performed tasks outside 
the scope of the camera lens.  The observer could usually hear all team members’ voices clearly.   
Observer Credentials. The primary observer (PO) in this study was a senior graduate 
student with a B.S. in Human Factors Psychology, all graduate coursework completed, and 
substantial research experience studying human error in aviation.  To prepare for this project, a 
thorough literature review was performed along with observation of approximately 15 surgical 
procedures to collect pilot data, which was used to develop the study design and data collection 
tool.  
The PO trained two senior undergraduate research assistants (RA) by accompanying 
them to four procedures with at least one from each procedure type.  During the first training 
procedure the RA was able to simply observe, become familiar with the OR, and watch and 
listen to the process of conducting the observation and data collection.  During the second and 
third training observations the RA and PO both recoded data. The RA could see the PO’s data 
sheet and they were able to quietly discuss any recording discrepancies or clarifications.  During 
the fourth training procedure, the PO observed the RA while they performed the entire data 
collection procedure as if they were alone.  Once training was complete, procedures were 
observed by whichever of the three qualified researchers was available to do so.  All researchers 
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were required to produce evidence that they were not currently infected with communicable 
diseases, and produce picture identification to gain entry to the surgery department.   
 
 
Figure 1.  Image of hernia repair procedure.  From far left; Circulator nurse, surgeon, first 
assist or “scrub” nurse, and the surgical technician.   
 
Surgical Procedures. The surgical procedures observed during this study were chosen 
specifically for their short duration, high frequency of occurrence, and the ability to provide a 
contrast between the open and laparoscopic surgical techniques. The participating surgeons were 
included in selecting procedures that qualified for inclusion in this study.  The laparoscopic 
cholecystectomy procedure is a minimally invasive method of removing the gallbladder.  This is 
achieved with the use of an instrument with a small camera on the end called a laparascope, 
which allows the surgeon to work inside the patient without having to make a significant 
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incision. During the open hernia repairs, which were either umbilical (near the bellybutton) or 
inguinal (near the groin), the surgeon had direct physical and visual access to the operative site 
through an incision in the lower abdominal area.  
 
 
Figure 2.  Image of laparoscopic cholesystectomy.  From left; First assist or  “scrub” nurse, 
surgical technician, surgeon (behind surgical technician). 
 
Data Management. The aspect of this study that was most likely to raise concern was 
the video capture in the OR.  To address this issue, the intent, purpose, storage and destruction 
protocol were outlined in the informed consent forms for all patient and staff participants who 
had the potential of being captured on video.  Participants remained anonymous, personal 
information was not collected or retained in any way.  Information collected from each surgery 
was referenced using an unrelated identification number. Videotapes were kept in a locked filing 
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cabinet in a private office, and were only accessed by authorized researchers. The videos were 
reviewed promptly and subsequently destroyed.  
Classification. Following an extensive literature review, a preliminary taxonomy was 
developed. After each case, the observer and principle investigator discussed the data collected, 
and made sure that the categories in the taxonomy could adequately represent all of the FDs 
observed, amending as necessary.  The reason for this was to avoid losing the specificity of the 
data by using categories that were too broad.  Organizing classified flow disruptions using a 
taxonomy provides a means of identifying trends in disruption patterns.  When trends are 
recognized, it may be possible to trace them to sources of frequent disruption, which could 
indicate where latent system failures lie.  The PO and one of the RAs who assisted with data 
collection classified flow disruptions into the categories of the taxonomy.  A third human factors 
researcher, a third year PhD student with extensive experience collecting and classifying flow 
disruptions in the OR, resolved all discrepancies between the original two raters. Each 
discrepancy was identified and transcribed along with both possible classifications from the 
original raters.  The third human factors researcher chose between one of the two potential 
categories in order to ensure 100% discrepancy resolution.  Final classifications were entered 
into the database.  
Variables. Flow disruptions are defined as events that result in a break in the flow of the 
primary surgical task, or the loss of any team member’s situational awareness with regard to the 
procedure at hand.  Time data was collected at many points throughout the procedure including 
the “start” time, “end” time as called by the circulator nurse, the time of each flow disruption, 
and the percentage of time the circulator nurse was on the computer. In addition to flow 
disruptions and time, several features of the surgical environment for the purpose of recording 
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the context and exploring other potential correlates to flow disruptions such as the frequency of 
the door opening and closing, the presence of music, and the number of procedures that the 
surgeon performed prior to the study procedure.  
Analysis. Flow disruption data collected during 23 procedures, over a seven-month 
period were included in this analysis.  Data were analyzed using a computer software program, 
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). Frequency counts were used to determine 
inter-rater reliability after the initial classification of flow disruptions, and to quantify the 
breakdown of flow disruption categories after the discrepancies were resolved. After flow 
disruptions were classified and entered into the database, descriptive statistics were obtained. 
The final categories of flow disruptions during both procedure types were analyzed in aggregate 
and in comparison to one another. A t-test was performed to determine whether the mean 
duration of each procedure was different at a significance level of a=.05.   A second t-test 
determined whether the average number of flow disruptions for each procedure type was 
significantly different from the other, and a third compared rates between procedures.  A Mann-
Whitney U test was performed to determine if each category was significantly different between 
procedure type. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
Of the 23 procedures analyzed, there were 14 laparoscopic cholecystectomies, and 9 open 
hernia repair procedures.  A total of 321 flow disruptions were recorded during 684 minutes of 
procedure time, for an overall flow disruption rate of .44, or one flow disruption every 2.23 
minutes. Examples of flow disruptions from each category are displayed in Table 1. 
Table 1   
Examples of flow disruptions recording during observation 
 
The overall inter-rater reliability achieved after the first two researchers classified each 
disruption was 74.6%.  The total number (and percentage) of flow disruptions in each of the 
seven categories are as follows; Communication, 109 (34.6%); Coordination, 89 (27.7%); 
External/ Extraneous, 51 (15.9%); Training/Supervisory, 31 (10.1%); Equipment/Supplies, 29 
Categories Examples 
Communication Anesthesiologist asks twice for scissors, receives no 
response, retrieves item himself 
Coordination Circulator nurse leaves to retrieve equipment and returns 
with incorrect item.  
External/ Extraneous Foreign staff comes in to relay information to the surgeon 
about a future patient 
Training/ Supervisory Surgeon quizzing medical student about patient anatomy 
Equipment/ Supplies Bovie ground wire became detached, function ceased and 
alarm engaged 
Environment Music interrupted by loud static from cell phone 
interference 
Patient Factors Patient hair preventing grounding pad from keeping 
contact 
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(8.4%); Environment, 8 (2.3%); and Patient Factors, 5 (1.4%). The percentage of flow 
disruptions broken down by category is depicted in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Total number of flow disruptions in each category.  
 
When flow disruption data was analyzed for each type of procedure, it was discovered 
that the rate of disruption was similar for each.  Laparoscopic cholecystectomies lasted an 
average of 29.25 (7.52) minutes and had an average of 13.29 flow disruptions per procedure, or 
one flow disruption every 2.20 minutes. Hernia repairs lasted 33.62 (5.92) minutes on average, 
with an average of 15 flow disruptions per procedure, for a rate of one flow disruption every 2.24 
minutes.  The categorical breakdowns of flow disruptions for each type of procedure are depicted 
in Figure 4.  The number (and percentage) of flow disruptions by type and procedure are as 
follows; Laparoscopic Cholesystectomy: Coordination 61 (32.8%), Communication 42 (22.6%), 
External/Extraneous 28 (15.1%), Equipment/Supplies 25 (13.4%), Training/Supervisory 22 
(11.8%), Environment 6 (3.2%), Patient Factors 3 (1.6%), and; Hernia Repair:  Communication 
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67 (49.6%), Coordination 28 (20.7%), External/Extraneous 23 (17%), Training/Supervisory 9 
(6.7%), Equipment/Supplies 4 (3.0)%, Environment 2 (1.5%), and Patient Factors 2 (1.5%) (See 
Table 2.). 
 
 
Figure 4.  Percentage of flow disruptions by category and procedure type 
Table 2 
Percentage of flow disruptions overall and for each procedure by category 
 
  Overall 
Laparoscopic 
Cholecystectomy 
Hernia 
Repair 
Equipment/ Supplies 9.0% 13.4% 3.0% 
Communication 34.0% 22.6% 49.6% 
Coordination 27.7% 32.8% 20.7% 
Training/ Supervisory 9.7% 11.8% 6.7% 
External/ Extraneous 15.9% 15.1% 17.0% 
Patient Factors 1.6% 1.6% 1.5% 
Environment 2.5% 3.2% 1.5% 
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Three t-tests were performed to determine if the average procedure time, number, and 
rate of flow disruptions per procedure differed between procedure types.  The average duration 
of each procedure type are significantly different from each other (p=.001 a; α≤.05).  Hernia 
repair procedures lasted significantly longer than laparoscopic cholecystectomy procedures.  The 
average number and rate of flow disruptions between procedures was not significantly different.   
 Results of the Mann-Whitney U test revealed that the coordination (p=.017), 
communication (p=.000), and equipment/supplies (p=.001) categories were significantly 
different between procedure type.  The laparoscopic cholecystectomy procedures were 
significantly higher than hernia repairs in the categories of coordination and equipment/ supplies.  
Hernia repair procedures had significantly more flow disruptions related to communication than 
laparoscopic cholecystectomies.    
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CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
There has been increasing interest in and use of flow disruptions as a metric to identify 
sources of latent system failures in recent years.  The first goal of this study was to identify the 
flow disruptions that occur in the operating room during laparoscopic cholecystectomies and 
open hernia repair procedures.  Results of this study revealed a rate of one disruption every 2.2 
minutes.  This rate also held steady when calculated for the two types of procedures separately.  
The rate of disruptions determined by the results of this study are similar to those found by 
Chisholm, Collison, Nelson & Cordell (2000), who reported that emergency physicians (EP) 
performed 22.5 tasks per hour and were interrupted 17.2 times per hour, which is about three 
interruptions for every four tasks performed.  A study by Healey, Sevdalis & Vincent, (2006) 
conducted during urological “same-day” surgical procedures; found a mean of 20.47 disruptions 
per case, with an interruption rate of 0.45 events/min, and average interruption duration of 
13.05% of procedure time.  Healey et al., (2006) recorded 13.56 disruptions per procedure, with 
an average rate of .29 events per minute. It is interesting to see the similarities between the 
findings of this study and the ones mentioned above.  It seems that studies performed in the 
“same-day” surgical unit and emergency departments are more similar to each other in terms of 
interruption rate, than when compared to more intensive and time consuming procedures such as 
cardiac surgery.  Studies have shown the disruption rates of these types of procedures to be as 
low as 8 per hour (Wiegmann et al., 2007). 
The differences that stand out the most are in the communication, coordination, and 
equipment/supplies categories.  The three largest categories of disruptions for each procedure 
type were communication, coordination, and external/extraneous. The laparoscopic 
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cholecystectomies, which are much more equipment intensive than the open hernia repair, had a 
much higher percentage of flow disruptions in the categories of equipment /supplies and 
coordination.  External/extraneous and training/supervisory related disruptions were much more 
prevalent in the laparoscopic cholecystectomy than the hernia reduction.  This may reflect the 
need for a greater depth of explanation and understanding before using laparoscopic technology.  
Using this technology may not be as straightforward and intuitive as direct manipulation of 
patient anatomy. Hernia repairs, which are performed using traditional surgical tools, had a much 
higher rate of communication related flow disruptions.  Recall that the average rate of 
disruptions were almost identical between the two procedures.  Though just as many flow 
disruptions occurred, the nature of disruptions were reflective of the environmental, equipment, 
and procedural differences between procedure types.  It was an interesting finding that hernia 
repair procedures were significantly longer than laparoscopic cholesytectomy, even with far less 
equipment and coordination related disruptions.  Future research could examine whether the 
additional visual feedback provided during laparoscopic procedures gives the team additional 
cues to guide the progression of the case.   
Through the identification of the flow disruptions, a tailored taxonomy was created that 
was able to accommodate all of the disruptions identified. The taxonomy was developed, at first, 
from a review of the human factors literature, and was amended as data was obtained, to ensure 
that each disruption could be represented. In addition to the seven main categories used in the 
analysis for this study, subcategories and “nano-categories”, or error codes, were also defined in 
the taxonomy. In order to compare and identify patterns across multiple studies and facilities, 
classification should be as unified as possible.  The error codes provide valuable and detailed 
information for the development of specific interventions, but will also serve to assist future 
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classification by providing examples of the type of disruptions assigned to each category. By 
providing this type of information, researchers will be able to unify the definitions of category, 
which could enable comparison and aggregation of results between studies, and the development 
of a flow disruption database.   
The classification and analysis of flow disruptions allows the identification of issues that 
affect the immediate surgical environment. Using a human factors taxonomy to classify flow 
disruptions allows researchers to drill down to identify specific problem patterns within specific 
procedures, but can also provide a more general picture of the data that could be used to identify 
patterns across departments or between hospital systems.  The nature and frequency of flow 
disruptions provide a general impression of how the larger influences like culture, scheduling, 
physical space, or budget constraints, may be creating unintended, unanticipated, and 
unnecessary problems “downstream” in the system, to the operating room.  Of course, gaining an 
accurate understanding of these larger constructs would require gathering a significant amount of 
additional information.  However, patterns identified in flow disruption data can indicate which 
aspects should be more closely scrutinized.    
It could be assumed that since the surgical team members for each procedure are formed 
in different combinations from the same pool of potential members, and that they are in the same 
environment, that they would encounter the same types of disruptions.  However, based on the 
results of this study, we see that is not the case. Despite the similarities in flow disruption rates 
for both procedures, the categorical breakdown revealed that the type of flow disruptions that 
occurred varied greatly from one procedure to the other.  This suggests that variables other than 
simply individual differences and team performance influence the type of disruptions 
encountered. 
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The flow disruption type that occurred most frequently overall was communication. This 
finding is consistent with similar studies in this area.  The Joint Commission on Accreditation of 
Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) identified communication as the leading root cause of 
wrong-site operations, and other sentinel events (Makary, et al., 2006). Fordyce et al.,’s (2003) 
prospective observational study in the emergency department (ED) revealed that 12% of reported 
errors were directly related to communication. Results of the Wiegmann et al. (2007) study of 
flow disruptions in the cardiac OR showed that communication had the strongest relationship to 
surgical errors, even when tested against all other disruption categories combined. Healey et al. 
(2006) determined that the most frequent disruption category was conversation, which also had 
the highest rating of interruption severity.   
Communication is obviously a major problem in healthcare, as well as one of the most 
complex.  In spoken communication, only 7% of meaning is derived from the actual words 
spoken, 38% is from paralinguistic qualities, such as tone and intonation, and 55% is revealed 
through facial expression (O’Connor et al., 2010).  There are many features of the health care 
industry that hinder effective communication.  Some are common to many complex industries 
such as environmental noise, physical distance, and time pressure to name a few.  But some are 
unique to health care such as the complicated handoff path and transfer of patients and 
information, the frequent rotation of team members, and the use of surgical gowns and face 
masks, which hide body language and facial expression. The flow disruption subcategories under 
communication for this study are misunderstanding, communication unheard, case related 
communication, and extraneous conversation.  To distinguish, extraneous communication under 
the communication category refers to conversation regarding non-case specific topics, whereas 
extraneous conversation under the external/extraneous category refers to a conversation initiated 
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by or directed to someone outside of the surgical team.  One intervention that has shown to have 
a positive impact on the rate of communication errors is the pre-operative brief (Hurlebert, 
2009).  Pre-flight briefings and debriefs have been standard operating procedure in commercial 
aviation for some time.  “The pre-operative briefing sets expectations for how the case will 
proceed, informs the OR of equipment needed, and if any difficulties are expected (Hurlebert, 
2009). Studies in the operating room have shown pre-operative briefings to open the lines of 
communication between team members and break down the traditionally steep professional 
hierarchy (Hurlebert, 2009). 
Coordination related flow disruptions included personnel exchanges, improperly 
configured equipment, failure to adhere to surgeon or team preferences, and requesting or 
providing assistance to fellow team members. Some studies use the term “teamwork” to describe 
coordination and communication together (Makary, 2006). For this study, communication and 
coordination remained as separate categories due to the discord in the nature of disruptions that 
fell into these categories respectively. While communication disruptions usually involved the 
verbal transition of information between at least two team members, coordination related flow 
disruptions often involved the interaction with some piece of equipment as well as at least one 
other team member. 
The equipment/supplies problems included malfunctions, improper use, unfamiliar 
equipment, and maintenance.  Equipment/supply related disruptions were significantly more 
frequent during laparoscopic cholecystectomy procedures, these procedures require significantly 
more sophisticated technological equipment than the open hernia repair, which is performed 
using traditional surgical tools.  While there is no doubt that laparoscopic surgery is an incredibly 
beneficial technology that has improved many procedures for both the medical community and 
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patients alike, there are still a few features of laparoscopic surgery that require a high level of 
mindfulness to contend with. For one, the surgeon is required to work in a three dimensional 
space portrayed as a two-dimensional image, which is also magnified beyond its actual size, 
creating a discrepancy between the visual and kinetic placement of surgical tools.  Also, the 
scrub nurse is usually responsible for manipulating the camera inside the patient, in synchrony 
with the surgeon, requiring her to maintain a high level of coordination, knowledge of the 
procedure, and high mental and physical demands.  In all but one procedure observed, a single 
monitor was positioned opposite the surgeon, slightly higher than his direct line of sight.  This 
means that the monitor was positioned directly next to the scrub nurse, causing her to have to 
twist her neck and head around to view the monitor.  To maintain a better view of the image of 
the monitor the room must be darkened, making visual cues and body language difficult to see, 
and moving around large equipment and cords potentially dangerous.   
Training/supervisory disruptions often included teaching a new skill, correcting an 
improper action, and posing questions to test the knowledge of the team, student, or trainee.  
Occasionally during this study a medical student observed and lightly participated in procedures.  
When the student was present, the surgeon would often verbalize his actions as he was 
performing the procedure, occasionally quizzing the student regarding patient anatomy, or other 
surgical knowledge.  Since the participating hospital was not a teaching institution, the presence 
of the medical student was infrequent, sporadic, and relatively informal.  Training/supervisory 
flow disruptions also included peer-to-peer training, and training to recognize surgeon-specific 
preferences.  In a teaching hospital, training is a substantially higher priority that occurs much 
more frequently.  Team stability and familiarity are believed to foster teamwork, which is 
integral to surgical success (Wiegmann, 2007).  However, teams with consistent members may 
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be more affected by the addition of an unfamiliar member, when compared to teams that do not 
remain consistent. For future research, it would be interesting to determine how the presence of a 
new surgical, nursing, or surgical technician impacts case progression and perceived teamwork 
in both variable and static teams.    
A similar percentage of extraneous disruptions were identified in both procedures. 
External/extraneous disruptions were generally imposed on the OR from outside and include 
extraneous people, phone calls, or intercom messages that did not relate directly to the procedure 
at hand.  The consistency in the rate of external/extraneous flow disruptions suggests that these 
type of disruptions are not as influenced by the procedure type.  Since these disruptions come 
from outside of the OR, it is understandable that the rate would remain consistent regardless of 
procedure type.    Addressing disruptions from extraneous sources would most likely include 
developing procedures for determining if the disruption is warranted, to the entire surgical 
department.  Future research could explore the relationship between external/extraneous flow 
disruptions and the safety climate of the surgery department. 
Flow disruptions that occurred rarely in both procedures were related to environmental 
and patient factors.  Environmental disruptions include problems with noise, temperature, and 
lighting.  The most frequent source of environmental disruption in the OR was related to music, 
which is permitted to play at the surgeon’s discretion.  Patient factors were usually related to the 
patient’s unique anatomy or condition being different from what the surgeon had expected.  Most 
often, an excessive amount of unanticipated adhesions or scar tissue was encountered.  
Interruptions may not be entirely bad, one study showed that an “interruption lag”, such as a 
phone ringing, can prompt a worker to mentally rehearse a task, which in turn can help them 
resume the task at the interrupted point more easily (Adamczyk & Bailey, 2004).  It is just as 
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important to understand which disruptions can be tolerated by the team in the operating room 
without causing a disruption, as it is to know which can’t.  This information can be used to 
develop new processes and procedures that substitute the most volatile disruptions with more 
harmless ones i.e. phone call vs. physically entering the room to deliver information or query a 
member of the surgical team.  Each flow disruption is not necessarily a negative event, in fact, in 
a time sensitive, information intensive, complex system with the potential for catastrophic 
consequences, certain disruptions are beneficial and necessary.  It is for this same reason that it is 
crucial to identify the disruptions that do have the potential to make a negative impact. The value 
of the interruption should be weighed against the potential impact it could have on patient safety 
before it is introduced into the operating room.  It is difficult to balance an individual’s capacity 
to handle interruptions, with their need for information (Adamczyk & Bailey, 2004). This can be 
especially true for the healthcare industry where patient confidentiality is a priority, and 
information can be time sensitive. For this study, there was no judgment made about the value of 
each disruption, nor was each disruption evaluated to determine the importance or the impact of 
the individual disruption.  Future research could provide criteria for what makes a disruption 
“negative” or “positive”, and how that information could be used in the design of interventions. 
 Limitations. There were several challenges that had to be faced at the beginning of this 
study. Prospective observation in the operating room has inherent resistance due to the sensitivity 
of patient privacy and perceived legal repercussions.  To ensure that no patient personal health 
information was collected, we did not record audio transmissions.  There is a chance that the 
observer may have misheard, misunderstood, or failed to hear some verbal transmissions.   Since 
the surgical staff attends to several procedures a day, it was not possible to speak with them after 
the procedure to clarify or better understand their thought process behind some activities.  
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Patients were scheduled for surgery approximately 2-3 days per week, and only a fraction of 
those were willing to consent to observation.  Consequently, the rate of data collection was 
sporadic and difficult to anticipate.  In addition, the hospital moved to an entirely new facility 
before reaching the original target of 40 observations, 20 of each type of procedure.  Though 
efforts were made to avoid such, on occasion a member of the surgical team would converse 
with the research assistants during the procedure.  When this did occur, it was recorded as a flow 
disruption.  
Conclusion 
The goal of this study was to identify and classify flow disruptions that occurred during 
two common and frequently performed general surgery procedures.  This yielded the quantity 
and rate of flow disruptions, as well as a breakdown of their “type”, or nature.  In addition, 
descriptions of the actual disruptions were recorded, allowing for a detailed analysis of recurring 
issues, which could serve to inform tailored interventions, or better understand the impact of 
specific disruptions.   The comparison of two procedures, similar in duration and frequency, but 
contrasting in surgical technique and technological dependence, produced results that reflect 
these differences. Further research is needed to better understand how flow disruptions relate to 
surgical outcomes, and whether they are a reliable indicator of the potential for adverse events.  
However, the current results suggest that flow disruptions can be used as a metric to identify 
various sources of interruptions across procedure types, while still being sensitive enough to 
capture procedure-specific differences that exist between them.  More validation is needed to 
determine whether flow disruptions provide specific enough information to develop interventions 
that can prevent or mitigate their damaging effects.  The results of this study emphasize the need 
to analyze specific procedures individually in order to identify the disruptions unique to each.  
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As seen, the overall breakdown of disruptions across procedures can be misleading.  Without 
investigating the data at a deeper level, blanket interventions could be put in place that may not 
be necessary or beneficial for all procedures. 
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APPENDIX A: Informed consent form for hospital staff 
 
Information Form for Participation in a Research Study 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
 
Your participation is requested in a research study being conducted by Dr. Chris 
Windham and members of the Human Factors and Systems department at Embry Riddle 
Aeronautical University.  
 
This is a study aimed at identifying factors that enhance the efficiency of team 
performance in the operating room.   
 
By signing this form, you are consenting to the observation of the laparoscopic 
cholesystectomy and hernia repair procedures you will take part in for the duration of this 
study. Throughout the procedures, data about team performance will be collected by a 
researcher.  In addition to the physical presence of a researcher, the procedure will be 
videotaped at a wide angle to capture a view of the entire surgical team. The video data 
will be reviewed by an objective surgeon in order to score the technical aspects of the 
procedure. 
 
Possible Benefits 
 
Participation in this study broadens the scope of information available to human factors 
and medical professionals who share the goal of patient safety.   
 
Risks and discomforts 
 
There are no known risks associated with this study.  
 
Protection of confidentiality 
 
No personal staff member information will be retained. Video tapes of the surgery will be 
reviewed by researchers, surgeons, and other hospital personnel associated with the study 
only.  Audio transmission will not be captured to ensure patient anonymity.  Video tapes 
will be stored in a secured area and will only be referenced by an unrelated identification 
number.  Video data will be reviewed promptly and subsequently destroyed.  No names, 
identification numbers, or other sources of identity will collected during the course of this 
study. 
 
Voluntary participation 
 
Your participation in this research study is voluntary. You may choose not to participate 
and you may withdraw your consent to participate at any time. You will not be penalized 
in any way should you decide not to participate or to withdraw from this study. 
 
Contact information 
 
If you have any questions or concerns about this study or if any problems arise, please 
contact Dr. Bert Boquet or Sacha Duff at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University at 
386.226.6790. If you have any questions or concerns about your rights as a research 
participant, please contact the Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University Institutional 
Review Board (386-226-7037).  A copy of the results of this study will be available upon 
request. 
 
I have read this information form and have been given the opportunity to ask 
questions. I give my consent to participate in this study. 
 
Participant’s signature: ________________________________   Date:  ______________ 
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APPENDIX B: Informed consent form for patients 
 
Information Form for Participation in a Research Study 
Embry Riddle Aeronautical University 
 
You are invited to participate in a research study conducted by Dr. Chris Windham and 
members of the Human Factors and Systems department at Embry Riddle Aeronautical 
University.  
 
This is a study aimed at identifying factors that enhance the efficiency of team 
performance in the operating room.   
 
Your participation in this study will be consenting to the observation of the surgical 
procedure you are about to undergo. Throughout the procedure, data about team 
performance will be collected by a researcher.  In addition to the physical presence of a 
researcher, the procedure will be videotaped at a wide angle to capture a view of the 
entire surgical team.   Video data will be used to clarify data collected during the surgery, 
and will be reviewed by a surgeon in order to score the technical aspects of the 
procedure. The surgeon will be given two brief surveys that convey their perceived 
difficulty level of the procedure and the overall effectiveness level of the surgical team.   
 
Possible Benefits 
 
Participation in this study broadens the scope of information available to human factors 
and medical professionals who share the goal of patient safety.   
 
Risks and discomforts 
 
There are no known risks associated with this study.  
 
Protection of confidentiality 
 
No personal patient information will be retained. Video tapes of the surgery will be 
reviewed by researchers, surgeons, and other hospital personnel associated with the study 
only. Audio transmission will not be captured to ensure patient anonymity. Video tapes 
will only be referenced by an identification number.  Video data will be reviewed 
promptly and subsequently destroyed.   
 
Voluntary participation 
 
Your participation in this research study is voluntary. You may choose not to participate 
and you may withdraw your consent to participate at any time. You will not be penalized 
in any way should you decide not to participate or to withdraw from this study. 
 
Contact information 
 
If you have any questions or concerns about this study or if any problems arise, please 
contact Dr. Bert Boquet or Sacha Duff at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University at 
386.226.6790. If you have any questions or concerns about your rights as a research 
participant, please contact the Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University Institutional 
Review Board.  A copy of the results of this study will be available upon request. 
 
I have read this information form and have been given the opportunity to ask 
questions. I give my consent to participate in this study. 
 
Participant’s signature: ________________________________   Date:  ______________ 
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APPENDIX C: Final categories, sub-categories, and error codes 
 
1. Equipment/ Supplies 
A. Malfunction 
a) Machine not working properly 
b) Machine not responding to input 
c) Request/ require assistance 
d) Structure failure 
e) Wrong tools in kit 
B. Improper Usage 
a) Tool used for unintended purpose 
b) Machine improperly operated 
C. Unfamiliar 
a) Team is unsure how to operate 
b) Unaware of purpose  
c) Capabilities not utilized/known  
D. Maintenance 
a) Adjustment 
b) Refill 
c) Reconnection/ Restart  
d) Preperation/ Cleaning (Camera, cautery tool, etc.) 
2. Communication 
A. Misunderstanding 
a) Heard wrong transmission 
b) Unaware of/ alternate meaning 
c) Insufficient explanation 
d) Used improper term 
B. Unheard 
a) Did not hear anything 
b) Unsure of what was said 
c) Message not received by intended recipient 
d) No response/recognition 
C. Extraneous Communication (not related to the case) 
a) Personal 
b) General-Medical/ hospital related 
c) Aggressive communication 
D. Case relavent communication 
a) Completing/ Updating charts/records 
b) Familiarization with team preferences 
c) Query/ Explanation of action/ Observation  
d) Suggestion 
e) Request/ Command 
f) Discuss/Request patient state/treatment 
3. Coordination 
A. Personnel Switch 
a) Break 
b) Shift change 
c) Team member cleans up and leaves procedure 
B. Break in routine 
a) Misplaced item 
b) Dropped item 
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c) Changing positions 
C. Preferences not adhered to 
a) Preferred tool/supply not in room/available 
D. Equipment 
a) Gas not on 
b) Gas left on 
c) Bovie pedal not set up 
d) Not Present 
e) Circulating nurse leaves to retrieve desired item 
f) Incorrect assembly 
g) Getting familiar/ testing 
E. Teamwork 
a) Movement of table in undesired direction 
b) Troubleshooting 
c) Break in Cohesion 
d) Performing multi-member task (e.g. Instrument count) 
e) Team member leaves room temporarily 
F. Assistance Requested / Required 
           a)    Setting/ Status change    
           b)    Failure to assist 
           c)    Responding to Request for Assistance 
           d)    Responded incorrectly  
                 e)    Failure to request assistance  
4. Training/Supervisory 
A. Teaching new skill 
a) Familiarization with instruments 
b) Familiarization with anatomy 
c) Familiarization with procedure/ process 
B. Correcting improper action 
a) Handing instruments to surgeon (wrong orientation, wrong tool) 
b) Handing suture needle to surgeon 
c) Guiding camera 
d) Reminding of omitted action 
C. Other Communication 
a) Query to Dr. 
b) Query to Anesthesiologist (AST) 
c) Query to circulating nurse 
d) Query/ Quizzing Trainee/ student 
e) Instructing/ Verbalizing action for instruction  
f) Advice/ Compliment 
5. External/Extraneous 
A. Extraneous person 
a) Extraneous conversation 
b) Query 
c) Information about future patient 
B. Phone call 
a) Answered 
b) Unanswered 
c) Made to give/obtain information 
d) Made extraneous call/ text 
C. Query 
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           a) Case relevant 
D. Intercom 
a) Notification of phone call 
b) Query 
c) DR responds 
6. Patient Factors 
A. Anatomy 
B. Unstable Vital Signs 
7. Environment 
A. Music/Noise 
a) Ipod malfunctioning 
b) Distracted/sidetracked by music 
c) Change volume/ song 
B. Temperature 
C. Lighting 
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APPENDIX D: Pre- and post-procedure survey for the acting surgeon 
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APPENDIX E: Inside of the data collection tool 
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APPENDIX F: Outside covers of laparoscopic cholecystectomy-specific data 
sheet
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APPENDIX G: Outside covers of the generic data collection tool 
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APPENDIX H: Image of Hernia Repair Procedure 
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APPENDIX I: Image of Laparoscopic Cholesystectomy Procedure 
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APPENDIX J: Examples of Flow Disruptions Recorded 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Categories Examples 
Communication Anesthesiologist asks twice for scissors, receives no 
response, retrieves item himself 
Coordination Circulator nurse leaves to retrieve equipment for 
anesthesiologist, returns without it, anesthesiologist 
already had item 
External/ Extraneous Foreign staff comes in to relay information to the surgeon 
about a future patient 
Training/ Supervisory Surgeon quizzing medical student about patient anatomy 
Equipment/ Supplies Bovie ground wire became detached, function ceased and 
alarm engaged 
Environment Music interrupted by loud static from cell phone 
interference 
Patient Factors Patient hair preventing grounding pad from keeping 
contact 
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APPENDIX K: Percentage of Flow Disruptions by Category and Procedure 
  Overall 
Laparoscopic 
Cholecystectomy 
Hernia 
Repair 
Equipment/ Supplies 9.0% 13.4% 3.0% 
Communication 34.0% 22.6% 49.6% 
Coordination 27.7% 32.8% 20.7% 
Training/ Supervisory 9.7% 11.8% 6.7% 
External/ Extraneous 15.9% 15.1% 17.0% 
Patient Factors 1.6% 1.6% 1.5% 
Environment 2.5% 3.2% 1.5% 
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APPENDIX L: Percentage of Flow Disruptions by Category 
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APPENDIX M: Percentage of Flow Disruptions by Category and Procedure Type 
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